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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Patrick Martin appeals from the district court's order denying his 
I.C.R. 35(c) motion in which Martin alleged the Idaho Department of Correction 
miscalculated his parole eligibility date by failing to give him credit for time served 
on both of his consecutive sentences. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On June 1, 2010, the district court entered Judgment upon jury verdicts 
finding Martin guilty of felony driving under the influence and felony leaving the 
scene of an accident. (#37890 R. 1 , Vol. II, pp.469-472; R., pp.31-34.) The court 
imposed a unified 10-year sentence with six years fixed for the driving under the 
influence charge and a consecutive five-year sentence with one year fixed for 
leaving the scene of an accident "for a total unified sentence of seven (7) years 
fixed and eight (8) years indeterminate with credit for 481 days served against 
the fixed portion of each sentence[.]" (#37890 R., Vol. 11, pp.470-471; R., pp.32-
33.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (#37890 R., Vol. II, p.471; R., p.33.) 
Two weeks later, the court entered a "Sentence Clarification," stating: 
The Department of Correction has asked for clarification of 
the Defendant's sentence imposed on June 1, 2010. The 
Defendant's sentence is a unified sentence of seven years fixed 
and eight years indeterminate. On Count I, the Defendant's 
sentence is for ten years, with six years fixed and four years 
indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the 
1 Pursuant to the Court's order, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts 
from Martin's prior appeal in Docket No. 37890 have been augmented to the 
record in this case. (Amended Order Augmenting Appeal, dated June 26, 2015 
(emphasis original).) 
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fixed portion of the sentence. On Count II, the Defendant's 
sentence is for five years, with one year fixed and four years 
indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the 
fixed portion of the sentence. Thus on Count II, all the fixed time 
has been served and only indeterminate time remains to be served. 
The sentences are consecutive. 
(R., p.24.) 
At the end of the retained jurisdiction period, the court placed Martin on 
probation. (See R., p.3 (entry dated 11/10/2010).) Approximately 18 months 
later, the state filed a motion for probation violation. (See R., p.5 (entry dated 
05/24/2012).) Martin admitted violating his probation and, on August 6, 2012, the 
district court revoked Martin's probation and ordered his sentence executed. 
(#37890, Order Revoking Probation and Judgment of Conviction and Order of 
Commitment, dated August 6, 2012 ("2012 Order") (augmentation).) 
On September 9, 2013, almost one year after revoking Martin's probation, 
the court entered a corrected revocation order to add language clarifying that 
Martin's sentences are consecutive. (Compare R., pp.14-15 ("2013 Corrected 
Order") with 2012 Order.) Both orders stated Martin would receive credit for 718 
days. (R., p.15; 2012 Order, p.2.) Four months later, on January 10, 2014, 
Martin fled a prose motion asking the district court to "correct" its 2013 Corrected 
Order to indicate that the 718 days credit for time served should apply to both of 
his sentences, and to "reflect that the 'fixed' portion of Count II has already been 
served." (R., pp.17-18 ("2014 Motion").) Martin contended that the 2013 
Corrected Order needed to be modified in order for the Department of Correction 
to grant him credit for time served on Count II. (R., p.18.) The district court 
denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it did not have "jurisdiction in [Martin's] 
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criminal case to grant the relief requested" and directing Martin to "file a of 
habeas corpus pursuant to I.C. § 19-4205." (R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal 
order. (See R., pp.6-7 (register of actions reflecting no notice of appeal filed after 
the court denied Martin's motion on February 10, 2014).) 
Eleven months later, on January 15, 2015, Martin filed a second motion 
for credit for time served pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c). (R., pp.51-52 ("2015 Motion").) 
In his 2015 Motion, Martin requested an order correcting the credit for time 
served to reflect a parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, and to "acknowledge" 
he is entitled to credit for time served on both counts, as stated in the Sentence 
Clarification entered on June 16, 2010. (R., p.52.) Martin's request was based 
on the state's calculation of credit for time served and parole eligibility, which the 
state provided in response to Martin's 2014 Motion. (R., pp.52, 55-57.) On 
February 27, 2015, the district court denied Martin's motion, stating: 
The Defendant has not presented any additional information 
that the court's calculation was incorrect under either Idaho Code 
§§ 18-309 or 19-2603. The Defendant is asking in this motion that 
the District Court order the Idaho Department of Corrections to 
calculate his time differently. 
The Court has no jurisdiction in this criminal case to grant 
the relief requested in this motion. Any writ of habeas corpus must 
be filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4205. Therefore, the 
Defendant's Motion for Correction of Miscalculated Sentence ICR 
35 subsection (c) is hereby DISMISSED. 
(R., pp.69-70.) 
Martin filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court's February 
27, 2015 order denying his 2015 Motion. (R., pp.71-75.) 
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ISSUE 
Martin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Martin's ICR 35(c) 
motion for correction of his sentence to accurately reflect credit for 
time served? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Is Martin's challenge to his 2015 Motion barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata? Alternatively, has Martin failed to show the district court erred in 
denying the relief he requested in his 2015 Motion? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Res Judicata Bars Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion; Alternatively, Martin 
Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion 
A. Introduction 
Martin asserts the district court erred in denying his 2015 Motion and 
claims the court's 2013 Corrected Order fails to properly give him credit for time 
served as evidenced by the Department of Correction's miscalculation of his 
parole eligibility date. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Martin further asserts the district 
court was required to remedy this alleged error pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Because Martin's 2015 Motion is an attempt to 
relitigate the same issue presented in relation to his 2014 Motion, this Court 
should find consideration of the 2015 Motion is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. Alternatively, Martin has failed to show error in the denial of his 2015 
Motion because he has failed to demonstrate that the district court's 2013 
Corrected Order was erroneous or that the district court erred in concluding it did 
not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to direct the Department of 
Correction to recalculate Martin's parole eligibility date. 
8. Standard Of Review 
"Questions of jurisdiction are questions of law over which this Court has 
free review," State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.3d 979, 981 (2010) 
(citation omitted), as is the "question of whether an action is barred by res 
judicata," State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) 
(citation omitted). "The question of whether a sentencing court has properly 
5 
awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is [also] a question 
of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasguez, 
142 Idaho 67, 68,122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 
Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly 
erroneous." State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P .3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 
2003)). 
C. Martin's 2015 Motion Challenging His Credit For Time Served Is Barred 
By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
"As a general matter, the doctrine of res judicata holds that in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former 
adjudication concludes parties and privies as to every matter offered and 
received to sustain or defeat the claim." Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 
482 (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted). In Rhoades, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that "the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration of 
subsequent Rule 35 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate 
issues already finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions." kl Martin's 2015 
Motion, from which he now appeals, is barred by res judicata because it is an 
effort to relitigate the same Rule 35 claim he previously asserted in his 2014 
Motion. 
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Martin filed his first motion for credit for time served on January 10, 201 
(R., pp.17-18.) In his 2014 Motion, Martin asserted, in relevant part: 
The Corrected Judgment entered on September 9th, 2013, 
does not reflect that the credit is to be taken from each of the two 
sentences. 
The Corrected [J]udgment does not reflect that the "fixed" 
portion of Count II has already been served. 
Because the wording of the Corrected Judgment entered on 
September 9th, 2013 does not reflect what was ordered by Judge 
Wetherell when he imposed the sentence upon the Petitioner, it has 
caused the Department of Corrections to not grant to the Petitioner 
the 718 days credit for time served against Count II. 
(R., p.18.) Martin also complained: "The time calculation of the Department of 
Corrections still has me serving a five year period of time" on Count II. (R., p.19.) 
The state filed a written response to Martin's 2014 Motion in which it set 
forth its belief that Martin was entitled to 728 days credit for time served, rather 
than the 718 days set forth in the court's 2013 Corrected Order, and submitted: 
. . . the Defendant's sentence is 10 years, with 6 fixed and 4 
indeterminate on count I, followed by 5 years, with 1 fixed and 4 
indeterminate on count II. On Count I, Defendant should be 
granted credit for 481 days served pretrial, 172 days served on his 
rider and 75 days served on the probation violation for a total of 728 
days. On Count II, Defendant is entitled to credit for 481 days 
served in pretrial incarceration. The State has no objection to the 
Court correcting the sentence in this matter to reflect the credit as 
set forth herein. Based on the State's calculations, Defendant's 
overall sentence, 15 years with 7 fixed (2557 days) and 8 years 
(2922 days) indeterminate, should be set off by 1209 total days of 
credit for time served. Therefore, as of the time of the Court's order 
revoking probation, Defendant had 1348 days to serve before he 
was parole eligible. His parole eligibility date would be 
approximately April 15, 2016. 
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(R., p.28.)2 
The district court denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it lacked 
jurisdiction in Martin's "criminal case to grant the relief requested in [his] motion." 
(R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal that decision. 
On January 15, 2015, Martin filed his second motion for credit for time 
served, asking the court to "correct" its "time calculation" to reflect a parole 
eligibility date of April 15, 2016. (R., pp.51-52.) Thus, in his 2015 Motion, Martin 
sought to relitigate the "matter offered and received" in relation to his 2014 
Motion. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. This is apparent given 
Martin's reliance on the state's response to his 2014 Motion as a basis for relief. 
(R., pp.51-52, 55-57.) While the language Martin used in his 2015 Motion 
focused on his parole eligibility date as calculated by the state in its 2014 written 
response, rather than the Department of Correction's alleged failure to give him 
credit for time served on Count 11, the ultimate purpose of the motion was the 
same. The facts in Rhoades are instructive on why res judicata precludes 
consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion. 
After a jury found Rhoades guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree 
kidnapping, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the district 
court sentenced Rhoades to death "for the murder and kidnapping charges, and 
a fixed life term for the robbery charge," but stated that "in the event the death 
2 The April 15, 2016 parole eligibility date suggested by the state in response to 
Martin's 2014 Motion is incorrect because it gives Martin 481 days credit for time 
served on the fixed portion of Count II even though the fixed term for that count is 
only 365 days. (R., p.70.) It is also based on 10 additional days credit for time 
served post-judgment, which are not included in the district court's calculation of 
718 days. (R., pp.69-70.) 
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sentences were commuted to life in prison or any other sentence, they would be 
enhanced by a fixed consecutive term of 15 years for the use of a firearm." 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 862, 11 P.3d at 481. "Following the imposition of 
sentence, Rhoades filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence seeking a 
correction of the sentence 'heretofore given by providing only one sentence for 
weapons enhancement per the entire transaction."' ~ at 862-863, 11 P.3d at 
481-482. The district court denied Rhoades' Rule 35 motion and Rhoades 
appealed, but he only challenged his convictions, not the denial of his request for 
Rule 35 relief. & at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. Several years after the Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed Rhoades' convictions, sentences, and the denial of post-
conviction relief, Rhoades filed a second Rule 35 motion "asking the court 'to 
correct the illegal firearms enhancements imposed in [his] case."' & The district 
court denied Rhoades' motion and Rhoades appealed. 
On appeal, in response to the state's res judicata argument, Rhoades 
asserted the doctrine did not apply because, he claimed, the issue he sought to 
relitigate in his second Rule 35 motion was "not the same issue litigated earlier." 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483. The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument as "without merit," explaining: 
In his first Rule 35 motion, Rhoades moved "to correct the sentence 
heretofore given by providing only one sentence for weapons 
enhancement per the entire transaction .... " Clearly, Rhoades was 
arguing he should have been given only one sentence 
enhancement for the entire course of events, rather than the three 
separate enhancements given by the trial judge. Similarly, in his 
current motion, Rhoades argues his sentence is illegal because he 
was given three separate sentence enhancements for conduct 
which constituted a single, indivisible course of conduct. While the 
two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they 
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nevertheless encompass the same issue; namely, whether the 
district judge erred in giving Rhoades a separate sentence 
enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted, rather 
than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of 
conduct. Thus, Rhoades is now seeking to relitigate the same 
issue already decided by the district judge and not appealed by 
Rhoades. Therefore, because consideration of the present motion 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the order of the 
district judge denying Rhoades' Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, albeit on different grounds than those used by the district 
judge. 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (ellipses original). 
As in Rhoades, consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata because it is an attempt to relitigate the same issue finally 
decided in his 2014 Motion.3 
0. Even If Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion Is Not Barred By Res 
Judicata, He Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The 
Motion 
Even if this Court concludes consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is not 
barred by res judicata, Martin has failed to show the district court erred in 
denying the motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) authorizes a district court to 
correct its "computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 18-309 or 19-2603" at "any time." On appeal, Martin argues the "district 
3 Also as in Rhoades, this Court may affirm based on res judicata even though 
the district court did not expressly deny Martin's 2015 Motion on this basis. 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (affirming denial of Rule 35 motion 
based on res judicata even though district court denied motion on merits); see 
also State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984)) 
("Where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though based upon an incorrect 
reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory.")). The district 
court did, however, note that it previously considered a similar motion and that 
Martin had not "presented any additional information that the court's calculation 
was incorrect." (R., p.69.) 
10 
court's corrected order and sentence does not give him full credit for the 
prejudgment time served on both courts [sic]. The fact that !DOC does not 
believe he is parole eligible until 2017 is proof of the error in the court's order and 
sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) "The fact" that Martin believes the 
Department of Correction has miscalculated his parole eligibility date does not, 
however, mean the district court's 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous or that the 
district court erred in denying Martin's 2015 Motion. The court's 2013 Corrected 
Order is silent on whether the amount of credit authorized applies to one or both 
of Martin's sentences; the order only provides that Martin should be given 718 
days4 credit for time served, "which includes time spent on the retained 
jurisdiction program." (R., p.15.) Although the order does not affirmatively state 
how the credit for time served should be allocated, Martin cites no legal authority 
4 The state notes there is a 10-day difference between the 718 days awarded in 
the court's 2013 Corrected Order (R., p.15), which is also reflected in the 
Department of Correction's Time Calculation Report (Appendix A), and the 728 
days the state relied on its response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which also formed 
the basis for its suggested parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, that Martin 
claims is correct (R., p.57; Appellant's Brief, p.7). Martin, however, does not 
directly challenge the 10-day difference or offer any argument or authority 
explaining why the district court's date calculation is incorrect. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Martin also does not directly challenge, or offer any 
argument or authority, to support a claim that the Department of Correction's 
August parole eligibility date is incorrect as compared to his requested April 
parole eligibility date, which cannot be explained by the 10-day difference in 
credit for time served. (Id.) Rather, Martin's complaints on appeal center on his 
assertion that the 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous because it "does not give 
him full credit for the prejudgment time served on both courts [sic]." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.6.) Martin has, therefore, waived any such challenge to the district 
court's 718-day calculation or the August parole eligibility date. See Murray v. 
State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be 
considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to consider 
appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or legal 
proposition to support his argument"). 
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the proposition that it is required to do so. Martin's claim that the district 
court's 2013 Corrected Order "was written so that he only received credit for 
prejudgment time served on one of the two counts" is without merit. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.6.) 
Martin's complaints about the district court's 2013 Corrected Order also 
ignore the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation Report he 
attached to his 2015 Motion. (R., p.67 (Appendix A5).) As noted by the district 
court, that document "show[s] IDOC credits the defendant with 559 days for jail 
and 158 days for I DOC on each offense. This totals credit for time served for 
pretrial and probation violation credit for 718 days credited on each offense 
toward the fixed time." (R., p.69 (emphasis added); see Appendix A.) The 
record, therefore, contradicts Martin's claim that the district court's 2013 
Corrected Order has prevented the Department of Correction from giving him 
credit for time served on both counts. In fact, it appears 718 days credit has 
been attributed to both counts even though Martin is not entitled to full credit on 
both.6 While the district court, in its Sentence Clarification, awarded Martin credit 
5 Attached hereto as Appendix A is the Idaho Department of Correction Official 
Time Calculation Report that appears in the record at page 67. 
6 The state acknowledges that, based on the Time Calculation Report (Appendix 
A), there appears to be a disparity between the number of days the Department 
of Correction has credited to Count II and the parole eligibility date it has 
calculated for Count II; however, that apparent disparity only reinforces the 
state's position, discussed infra, that Martin must pursue the relief he seeks by 
filing a habeas petition under I.C. § 19-4205, so that the disparity may be 
explored in an action to which the Department is a party. 
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for prejudgment time served on both counts, 7 Martin is not legally entitled to 
credit on both counts for time served after judgment was entered.8 Indeed, that 
was not the state's position in its written response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which 
Martin adopted in support of his 2015 Motion. (R., p.57.) Nor does Martin 
appear to believe otherwise on appeal as indicated by his assertion that his 
"proper parole eligibility date" is "approximately April 15, 2016," "as set out in the 
State's response to his original motion." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Because the 
record shows that the Department of Correction appears to have given Martin 
more credit than he is due on Count 11, and nothing in the district court's 2013 
Corrected Order has prevented Martin from getting more credit than he is due, 
Martin's only viable argument is that the Department of Correction has 
7 The district court's award of credit for prejudgment time served on both counts 
was not consistent with the law as set forth in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352, 
630 P.3d 143, 144 (1981 ), in which the Court held a defendant could not receive 
prejudgment credit for time served for each separate crime. The Idaho Supreme 
Court recently overruled Hoch in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 
(2015), but concluded its "new interpretation of Idaho Code section 18-309's 
plain language only prospectively and to cases now on direct review." 
Nevertheless, the state is not seeking affirmative relief on the misapplication of 
credit for time served prejudgment. 
8 "[P]eriods of post-judgment incarceration," including "time spent in the retained 
jurisdiction program," "must be credited to the sentence." State v. Albertson, 135 
Idaho 723, 725, 23 P.3d 797, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Similarly, 
"if a defendant was arrested for probation violations and spent time in 
confinement awaiting the disposition of the alleged violations, that incarceration 
must be credited against the underlying sentence .... " 1st (citing I.C. § 19-2603, 
other citations omitted). Unlike I.C. § 18-309, which authorizes prejudgment 
credit on "the offense," without limitation, Owens, 158 Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at 
33, I.C. § 19-2603 only allows for credit on the defendant's sentence. Martin's 
"sentence" is for an overall term of 15 years with seven fixed; he is not entitled to 
double credit for time served on that sentence post-judgment. Nothing in the 
decisional law of this state or the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 provides 
otherwise and Martin does not appear to contend otherwise. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p.7.) 
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miscalculated his parole eligibility date. On this point, the district court correctly 
concluded it did not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to "grant the relief 
requested." (R., p.70.) 
Idaho Code Section 19-4205(2)(c) provides that a prisoner may file an 
application for writ of habeas corpus to address "[m]iscalculation of his 
sentence." It is clear that I.C. §19-4205 is the proper mechanism for suing the 
Department of Correction if Martin believes the Department has calculated his 
parole eligibility date incorrectly. See Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 139 
P.3d 773 (2006).9 It is equally clear that I.C.R. 35(c), which only allows the court 
to determine the amount of credit for time served due to a defendant, is not the 
proper mechanism for requiring the Department of Correction to recalculate a 
parole eligibility date. See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143 
(2009) (district court jurisdiction under I.C.R. 35 limited by scope of relief 
authorized by the rule). As such, Martin has failed to show any error in the denial 
of his 2015 Motion. 
9 Initiating the cause of action authorized by I.C. § 19-4205 is necessary for the 
district court to obtain jurisdiction over the Department of Correction and order it 
to perform whatever act the court deems appropriate. Indeed, in his 2014 
Motion, the only case Martin cited was Fullmer, supra. (R., p.19 (citing Fullmer, 
143 Idaho 171, 139 P.3d 773).) The district court twice instructed Martin to 
pursue relief under I.C. § 19-4205 (R., pp.50, 70), and it is unclear why Martin 
has refused to take this course of action. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Martin's request for 
relief pursuant to !.C.R. 35(c). 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2015. 
JE~Sl¢A M. LORELLO 
De~ Attorney General 
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303 W. Bannock 
P. 0. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
JML/dd 
f . n f 10t\/uutv 
JESSIQA M. LORELLO 




I D A H O D E p\~~\~ 9°~: C O R R E C T I O N 
0 F F I C I A L T I M E C A L C U L A T I O N R E P O R T 
COMMITMENT NAME: MARTIN, MICHAEL PATRICK IDOC NUMBER: 96254 















6- 0- 0 
10- 0- 0 
DATE OF SENTENCE 08/06/2012 
SENTENCE EFFECTIVE DATE 
cc/cs TO SENTENCE I 
CONSECUTIVE BEGIN DATE 


















1- 0- 0 










CC= Concurrent, CS= Consecutive, CL= Consecutive to All 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REMARKS: 
GENERAL 08,08.12AG*/08,08,12 J-AUDIT.BP 
STATUS PERIODS: 






398 Present at Facility 
87 SENTENCE DATE 
642 RELEASED FROM FACILITY 
132 Present at Facility 
27 S'ENTENCE DATE 
067 
. ,, 
